's goal in proposing a new 'flexible historical institutionalism' is to add ideas and agency to historical institutionalism's emphasis on institutions. In this, Bell comes quite close to the goal of my own work. What I find problematic is the way he gets that to that goal, which begins by singling out my work on 'discursive institutionalism', as well as Colin Hay's 'constructivist institutionalism' and Mark Blyth's 'ideational turn', for critique as radically ideational, post-modern to the point of relativism, and anti-institutionalist. In their stead, he proposes a 'morphogenetic' epistemology that he claims allows him to maintain institutions and ideas as separate yet dialectically intertwined. He then he offers an empirical case in illustration. In what follows, I will first respond to Bell's criticisms, and then suggest that Bell's own attempt to construct a 'flexible' historical institutionalism in opposition to this work does not succeed on its own terms.
problematic because it would imply Hay doesn't take account of institutions at all, which is hard to square with his published work. Indeed, surely the burden of proof lies with
Bell to show what is wrong with this position, rather than simply positing it as somehow beyond the pale? Bell draws upon a mere sliver of Hay's vast empirical and theoretical contribution to justify this claim. As such, it appears as more of an assertion than an argument backed up by evidence.
Bell's actual argument against Hay is that his 'irredeemable ideationalism' rests upon a contradiction. Bell quotes Hay as arguing that "institutional change does indeed occur in a context which is structured," 5 but then cites as contradictory Hay's statement that "the outcome of political struggles "can in no sense be derived from the extant institutional context itself." But why is this contradictory? A contradiction is the juxtaposition of two simultaneous truth statements where each entails the negation of the other. In contrast, there is nothing contradictory in positing that 'politics occurs in a context that in and of itself does not determine outcomes,' as Hay has done here. 6 There is nothing very controversial here, and it does not look to be very far from Bell's own argument concerning what Anthony Giddens used to refer to as the 'duality of structures' that he draws upon later in his article.
Bell's Critique of Mark Blyth
I see three problematic aspects to Bell's criticisms of Blyth's work. First of all, Bell suggests that Blyth has an "ideationally 'primitive' (Bell's emphasis) account of institutional life and change," which leads to "a lack of empirically grounded theorizing about how agents and their ideas actually connect with institutions or indeed wider structures." 7 I find this difficult to square with the published work of Blyth with which I am acquainted. Indeed, one could argue that setting out to provide an empirically "institutions merely as arenas which 'frame the discourse,'" with the institutionalism in discursive institutionalism "reduced to the 'constructs of meaning which are internal to sentient (thinking and speaking) agents,'" with institutions that "simply appear as a "meaning context," "background information," or as "contingent (the result of agents' thoughts, words, and actions)." 16 My discomfort with Bell's criticism of my work is he is cutting up a complex set of arguments in such a way that I do not recognize my own work in his rendition of it.
To clarify, I call my approach 'discursive institutionalism' to highlight the need to add a fourth institutionalism to the three older 'new institutionalisms' that are focused on rationalist interests, historical regularities, and cultural frames. 17 I see this as an umbrella concept for the vast number of approaches that deal with the substantive content of ideas 18 as well as the interactive processes of discourse, whether coordinative ones among policy actors 19 or communicative ones between political actors and the public, 20 all of which take place in specific and pre-defined institutional contexts. Unlike Colin Hay's work, whose purpose in calling his approach 'constructivist institutionalism' is to delineate an ontological position, I leave open where the wide range of discursive institutionalist scholars fit on a continuum between positivism and constructivism. 21 Far from rejecting institutions for ideas and allowing agents to build the world as they see fit,
I take a quite moderate constructivist position.
Like Bell, I have long appreciated institutions as simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning, that are both external to and yet internal to sentient agents whose "background ideational abilities" (building on Searle's work) explain how they are able to create and maintain institutions, while their "foreground discursive abilities'" (building on Habermas' communicative action) explain how agents communicate critically about those institutions in order to change or maintain them. I take this position precisely because it avoids the epistemological problems of radical ideationalism Bell identifies. More specifically, I most often quite explicitly precede my discursive institutionalist discussion of the politics of ideas and discourse with a historical institutionalist account of crisis-driven and/or incremental changes in rules and regularities, which is precisely what Bell seeks to do. 22 For public policy in particular, moreover, I have repeatedly argued that discourse is just one explanatory factor, along with policy problems, policy legacies, policy preferences, and political institutional arrangements. And once available, I did in fact put my concerns on paper. 
Morphogenics, Change, and Endogeneity
Bell's preferred alternative is derived from scholars whose constructivism is sometimes described as 'critical realist' (e.g., Margaret Archer) or 'semi-rationalist' (e.g., Wendt or Culpepper). I would argue that the key problem with the approach he borrows from is that it is hard to figure out what institutionalism means in such a framework.
From the perspective of the non-initiated, it actually looks as if institutions have whatever causal properties the author says they have at any given moment. Specifically, Bell argues that institutions can be both resources and constraints at the same time. Such a position is intuitively appealing, but I argue, it fails in practice to produce empirically verifiable results.
Bell's alternative to what he calls constructivist institutionalism is based upon the juxtaposition of three claims. First, as noted above, is the constructivist claim that "agents interpret and construct the experience of their institutional situation using subjective and inter-subjective cognitive and normative frameworks and discursive processes." 26 This statement is then juxtaposed to two flexible-institutionalist claims, that "agents still have contingently variable degrees of agential space or 'bounded discretion' within institutional settings," and that "institutions…[have]…important empowering and enabling effects." 27 Bell argues that the payoff to embedding the constructivist claim in the two institutionalist claims is that this will move us beyond "a series of dualisms" concerning "change and stasis" that bedevil current approaches to explaining institutional change endogenously. The dualisms are, first, agents are constrained and enabled; second, institutions are structures and structures are institutions; third, constraints are empowerments and limitations. Bell sees these 'change-stasis' dualisms as a mistake since "evolution and more radical change can be handled similarly," with the only difference being that, "the level of actor discretion may increase under crisis conditions." 28 Getting beyond these dualisms, he insists, allows us to see that "the line between stability and change is quite blurred." 29 Going further still, Bell then argues that these flexible-institutionalist accounts must also be embedded in wider structuralist accounts. But we must also remember that, like institutions, "structures can both help constrain and empower agents." Indeed, he says that "structures have institution-like effects" and "institutions will also typically mediate structural effects." Invoking morphogenesis and dialectics sounds good, but it still suffers the same weakness as it did when Anthony Giddens introduced structuration theory thirty years ago. 32 It restates the problem: it does not solve it. 33 Moreover, if institutions are simply environmental objects agents can use (resources), then their institutional effect, their ability to structure behavior, falls away. To get over this problem, one would have to specify the scope conditions governing how and when institutions constrain, and by what degree, over time, which is very difficult: and it is noteworthy that Bell makes no attempt to do so. Alternatively, as I have repeatedly argued, one could consider how agents get beyond their institutional constraints, with ideas conveyed through discourse having a causal effect on their environment. Bell seems to want to make such a move, given his first statement that "agents interpret and construct the experience of their institutional situation using subjective and inter-subjective cognitive and normative frameworks and discursive processes." 34 But the morphogenesis/dialectics position he invokes, where institutions are structures and resources at the same time, obviates this progressive extension of existing work.
For Bell, institutions constrain, until they don't, when they become resources, or structures, which is when agents use them to change things, thereby using institutions to change institutions. This deep endogeneity problem robs institutions as a concept of its original, and valid, analytic purchase. Turning to ideas and discourse as I have chosen to do is one way out of this impasse. Despite his own constructivism, Bell's morphogenetics and dialectics blocks off that route, and without that escape route one needs a metric for when institutions constrain and when they do not if they are to be both resources and constraints at the same time. Without such a metric of scope conditions one is left in the position where one declares a change and invokes flexible institutions/resources to explain it, with the 'proof' of flexibility being other periods where the change is not
observed, which in turn shows that, by logical equivalence, institutions were in these periods non-flexible. In addition to being tautological, such a stance is purely descriptive.
It is neither explanatory nor analytic.
In Defense of Dualisms
Bell's alternative, the embrace of dialectics and morphogenesis, posits that was critiquing in the earlier part of the paper. 38 Bell next refers to the politicians' fear of the deficit as a 'fixation' that "illustrates the importance of constructivist insights as well as insights about bounded discretion." 39 Here he puts the emphasis on "the mindset of the policy authorities [remaining] locked," with cognitive locking and "ideational path dependence," concepts developed by both Blyth and Hay, coming to the fore. 40 Interestingly, when Bell tries to be more institutionalist, noting that "institutional and policy legacies" are determining, one finds that they are in fact determining of "RBA leaders…novel interpretations," 41 which allowed them, in this moment of uncertainty, to change policy, which sounds awfully like Blyth's argument in Great Transformations.
Later in the case study Bell details the battle between inflation hawks and doves, to find that the doves won-out because of their ability to appeal to the bank's Keynesian dual mandate. Bell invokes the central bank's dual mandate as a legislative fact -an institution -that tempers the power of ideas. 42 But I would, drawing on my own work, argue that specific polity types (institutions) give rise to particular discursive processes that are causally important in their own right. 43 The dual mandate is a social fact, which means that it is also a norm about what policymakers should do, and is therefore as ideational, constructed, and as contested as it is institutional, and that contestation is at base discursive.
Following this episode Bell again stresses "the ideational front" opening up when a paper by an economist in the early 1990s apparently changes everyone's mind about the sources of the deficit. 44 As Bell summarizes, "the ideas of policy makers were thus a crucial element in interpreting reality and in shaping policy options… [ 4 Bell, 'Do We Really Need a New 'Constructivist Institutionalism?', p. 4. 5 Bell, 'Do We Really Need a New 'Constructivist Institutionalism?', p. 5. 6 What is contradictory, as we shall see below, is that institutons are both constraining and enabling of action.
